Abstract
This paper explores the European Union’s Green Deal (EGD) growth strategy, social market economy, and climate resilient implementation. The analysis draws on a survey that was administered to the twenty-seven European Union Member States to examine the governance and implementation of the EGD. The European Commission’s Green Deal strategy reflects a cognitive-instrumental rationale –a green-type of Renaissance- emerging from a web of interconnected crises. The first global polycrisis (2009-2016) led to domestic vulnerabilities resulting in the European polycrisis. Data highlighted institutional gaps in governance frameworks. The second global polycrisis (2020- to date) led to challenges for the EU and survey results have outlined regional, cultural, and economic differences in shaping sustainable transformations. Southern EU Member States – Greece, Italy and Spain – indicated lower institutional trust, weaker local enforcement, and economic constraints.
The EGD is a strategy establishing Regulations and Directives; while both require implementation, Regulations leave national governments to organise enactment processes, whereas Directives allow them to choose execution procedures for stakeholder engagement, regulation approaches, and policy development. The caveat in the strategy lies in the structural asymmetries of governance implementation in the financial, administrative, socio-economic, migratory, energy, environmental and geopolitical sectors.
Notably, the first wave crisis instigated challenges to institutional trust, governance implementation and public confidence. While Greece, Italy and Spain experienced structural traps, Ireland saw an open opportunity to pilot We the Citizens (2011), a Constitutional Convention (2012), and, the Irish Citizens’ Assembly (2016), institutionalising deliberative democracy. Ireland’s experience is understood by examining how social and economic marginalisation can be converted into robust structural innovation. This paper explores the importance of an Irish-style deliberation to restore confidence in national multilevel governance and to create a resilient EU southern region. Deliberative democracy needs to be able to overcome contradictory interests. This could be done through a partnership for dialogue between the European Union and the Union of the Mediterranean on Deliberation (EUFMD) that would possibly strengthen participation and enhance EU southern cooperation.
Introduction
The European Green Deal (2019) is a comprehensive growth strategy presented by the European Commission which recognizes the intrinsic relation amidst healthy people, societies and a healthy planet. Furthermore, it promotes fair economic growth and a resource-efficient economy supporting net-zero emissions to be achieved by 2050, while making the pledge to leave no one behind. To achieve this, the strategy has implemented ambitious targets to: i) address the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions; ii) promote sustainable job opportunities; iii) invest in renewable energy; iv) enhance sustainable and environmentally friendly farming and forestry; v) support local communities and livelihoods, and vi) to encourage a circular economy for a sustainable future (S&D, 2024).[i]
The EGD itself is not a binding legislative Act but a Commission strategy rooted in the twenty-four page document, Communication on the European Green Deal (COM/2019/640 final); (European Commission, 2019) which nominally serves as the roadmap to the EU’s growth and environment strategy outlined in the comprehensive scheme of EU Regulations and Directives[ii].
Structural deficiencies begin with the adoption of European objectives; specifically, the implementation of EU Regulations and Directives across Member States differs in relation to their enforcement which, according to the data collected, are mostly attributed to inherited domestic models of governance, different political cultures, conflicting administrative traditions and stakeholder behaviours. These, in effect, develop different outcomes in the EU’s targets.
This raises the question of governance and how the EGD growth strategy can be achieved across administrative and political environments throughout each Member State. The answer lies in acknowledging the European Commission’s (EC) underlining focus on public participation where southern EU Member State citizens can contribute through their experiences and knowledge, and can assist in creating a successful transition that will lead to a greener and sustainable future (C.Giannou, 2022).
Analysis of original stakeholder survey on the governance and implementation of the European Green Deal
This paper draws on a survey that was administered to the twenty-seven European Union Member States to examine the governance and enforcement of the European Green Deal. The survey was sent to the following stakeholders: farmers’ unions; environmental organisations; small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs); large corporations; Members of the European Parliament (MEPs); and elected representatives at national and local-government level. The results of the cluster analysis derived from data which concerned the understanding of the European Union’s Green Deal within the general context of the strategy. The questions were based on how prepared the relevant actors / systems were for the green transition; concerns about transportation, energy, water consumption, manufacturing; clean fuel energy consumption; understanding of EU’s Taxation Directive (2022) and revisions; food technology; assessment of previous environmental approaches; small and large-scale farmers; Genetically Modified Organisms (GMO’s), and future jobs/skills training. The survey began in May 2022 and is ongoing (Giannou, 2022).
Documentation results indicated that survey participants had moderate understanding of the EGD; however, fell short in their knowledge of policy enactment, notably, the Energy Taxation Directive (2021). Answers also revealed institutional gaps with reference to governments, which were viewed as moderately prepared, while local actors were seen as underperforming, particularly when comparing the southern EU Member States of Greece, Italy, and Spain, with the northern counterparts of Germany, Netherlands, and Denmark who were perceived as having higher levels of preparedness, stronger governance structures, and proactive business engagement. Specifically, Figure 1. (above) shows different perceptions of procedural preparedness across stakeholder groups. The divergences in governance approaches may be explained by further examining the interrelationship of global challenges and their trans-boundary effects of the first and second polycrisis which ignited enforcement challenges in southern EU Member States (Zeitlin , et al., 2020; Schreiber, et al., 2025)
Namely, the EGD was formed within the space of two global polycrises that transcended to the EU and called on Member States to mitigate a series of specific challenges; the Eurozone crisis, migration and refugee flows, and systemic health shocks from COVID-19, all of which contributed to unprecedented public debt. Subsequent major exogenous stressors include Russia’s war on Ukraine, which further instigated the weaponization of energy and security (Zeitin, et al., 2020; Schreiber, et al., 2025) and later Iran. These crises fractured cohesion with EU Member States and kindled changing cleavages between the southern and northern financial space (Pena & Schumann, 2020). The displacement burden sharing of populations, Russian hybrid power, the series of color revolutions by post-Soviet States, the annexation of Crimea and war on Ukraine led to a series of US-EU sanctions causing asymmetric external shocks and absorption in the EU agrarian economy, particularly to the south which was financially weaker. While recent disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz further provoked divergent maritime supply shock in the EU’s agricultural sector, which saw the imposition of price caps and tax reliefs as measures to prevent a food sector collapse (Maturana, 2026).
The question is how can the EU address crisis distress issues to avoid severe spillover effects into social, financial, health, energy, and security sectors while securing cohesion between EU Member States? The EU itself cannot solely provide the answer in that, national governments are sovereign over their political institutions and systems including their public administration[iii].
The question remains: how are structural components shaped to create legislation that will mitigate systemic shocks, structural ruptures, and asymmetric volatility resulting from endogenous or exogenous stressors? The empirical analysis indicated that social-cultural barriers can play a pivotal part when it comes to southern EU Member States transitioning to greener models; specifically, survey responses received by southern EU Member States mapped how cultural norms can actively shape sustainable transformation which fundamentally suggests that the implementation of European legislation needs to take into account divergent socio-cultural paradigms (C. Giannou, 2022).
Civic societies have different resources, and this creates diverse needs. Professor David Easton stated that through the political system, civic society can decide how their values are distributed and, within this scope, make decisions that will be binding for everyone (see figure 2) (Institute PolSci, 2025).
Figure 2: An Adapted Political Systems Model for Green Deal Implementation. Source: Christina Giannou, 2022
This paper explores the question of whether narrowing the gap between EU policy targets and national adoption calls for systemic changes in governance? Explicitly, can participatory mechanisms have a definitive role in the implementation of EU Regulations and form methodologies to embed EU Directives? For this to be done, there will be a discussion of how Irish-style deliberation encompassed civic views that were regarded as a key component to deliver democratic and inclusive procedures. Moreover, deliberation in southern EU Member States will be examined through empirical evidence exploring the idea of a Mediterranean platform that could institutionalise deliberative mechanisms which will strengthen the participation of EU southern stakeholders and enhance regional cooperation and policy ownership.
Deliberative Democracy
Institutional deliberative democracy – Successes and challenges
Answers from the survey identify northern and southern divergences between EU Member States and call on the immediate need to narrow the dichotomy in the pillars of governance and economy; institutionalised deliberative democracy is a systemic order that accommodates true democratic principles. The concept discerns reliable relations between citizens and government that further foster partnerships and initiatives providing inherent benefits to economic and social development through sustainable solutions which further support financial and climate initiatives where the latter are outlined in the Paris Agreement (2015) drawn at the UN Climate Change Conference (COP21) ( Maizland & Fong, 2026; Landemore & Fourniau, 2022).
Deliberative representation or mini publics is not a new concept, it has existed since classical Athens (Dahl, 1989). In the last two decades, it resurfaced as a deliberative wave, and has drawn on numerous cases of deliberative processes initiated by public authorities (Landemore & Fourniau, 2022; OECD, 2020). The question that emerges is whether citizens can represent the people, especially within the scope of legislative functions.
Professor James S. Fishkin underscores that deliberation, mass participation, and political equality pose a pattern of conflict. He aimed to achieve deliberation through deliberative polls, expressing that all three democratic ideals cannot be maximised at once (Fishkin, 2009). Philosopher Cristina Lafont was concerned with the normative dilemma of Fishkin’s approach in reference to representation and participation inequalities, hence referring to the latter’s methodology as the shortcut view (Lafont, 2014). Although, at first glance, Fishkin’s, and Lafont’s opposing views create a chasm in the process of deliberative democracy, the silver lining is in the question they are addressing. Fishkin examines how to better the quality of public opinion. Whereas Lafont considers the philosophical question of who has the right to deliberate (Fishkin, 2009; Lafont, 2014).
Lafont states that governments can ensure the transparency of Citizens’ Assemblies and connect parliament and civil society, thus supporting institutional integration, whereas Fishkin focusses in improving the decision-making process. When looking at the divergence between the north and south, what is being examined is not necessarily how southern EU citizens will deliberate but the manner in which the concept can be institutionalised into governance mechanisms that will further support policymaking processes ensuring the transparency of their recommendations, hence reducing the governance deficit, and increasing the implementation of focused policymaking.
Divergent governance between the Northern and Southern EU Member States
The collected survey data showed moderate understanding of the EGD but weak policy knowledge of its specifics, with respondents generally understanding the Green Deal while lacking familiarity with specific legal and economic instruments. Specifically, 39% rated their understanding as 4 out of 5. Moreover, respondents signalled a low conceptual clarity of the EU Energy Taxation Directive (2022) where 35.1% indicated an insight at just 1 out of 5.
Government Preparedness: Southern EU Member States of Greece, Italy, and Spain showed lower institutional trust, weaker local implementation capacity, and greater economic constraints.
Implementation: Cultural traits and regional differences play a significant role, especially when examining northern and southern EU Member States, where societal norms influence the acceptance and implementation of green policy strategies (see Figure 3).
Political Will: On the matter of political commitment to enforce green policies, respondents expressed concerns with 23.4% rating the use of clean energy in their country as disappointing and 41.6% as low.
The Green Transition and Divergent Economic Readiness
Business contingency: Large enterprises are seen as more prepared for the green transition (28% rated 4 out of 5), while small/medium enterprises and local farmers are less prepared (35% rated SMEs as 2 out of 5, and 33% rated local farmers as 2 out of 5).
Economic Sectors of Concern: Transportation, energy, manufacturing, and water consumption are the most significant areas of concern for participants (see Figure 4).
Green Job Development: There is considerable scepticism about actors’ readiness to provide future jobs and skills training for the green transition (34% rated SMEs as 2 out of 5, and 26% rated central governments as 3 out of 5).
Funding and Investment: The survey underscored the need for increased investment in clean energy, with 23.4% of respondents rating it as disappointing (see Figure 5).
Divergent Cultural Traits and their effect on the readiness of the Green Transition
Cultural Traits: Respondents underlined that cultural traits significantly influence the green transition. Traditions, education levels, and openness to change vary across regions, especially the north and south, and affect the implementation of sustainable practices.
Public Awareness: On the issue of public awareness, collective responses provided clear views on the significance of cultural norms; respondents from northern EU Member States outlined societal awareness as an important deterrent when perceiving the readiness towards a greener transition (see Figure 6).
Cultural traits and resistance to change: Further to the topic on public awareness, social-cultural mindsets play a pivotal role when it comes to the discussion of change. Shared responses clearly mapped the effect of cultural norms when being viewed through the EGD lens; this is especially the case when analysing the green transition in the southern and northern regions (see Figure 7).
Discussion
Governance perspective
The findings show a relatively nuanced familiarity of EGD policies with the notable exception of the EU Energy Taxation Directive. A further concern is the weakness of national governance to support successful operationalization. Specifically, the top-down approaches of EU policymaking where targets are formulated at the European level suggests that if no one is to be left behind, EU legislative formulation needs to consider varying national political and institutional paradigms. This is especially an area for dialogue when looking at comments disclosed in the survey from participants in southern EU Member States comparatively to their northern counterparts.
Economic readiness
Provisions are needed that will ensure financial incentives to support SMEs and local farmers to transition to sustainable practices. Also, investments in green job development and skills training require a less decentralised model especially when viewing the topic from a southern perspective (Pietro Di, 2020). Notably, with reference to the participant from Greece who expressed, ‘…Greek stakeholders have that everyone is corrupted and there is no need to try for anything,’ this clearly outlines disparities in green development initiatives (Privitera, 2025). Moreover, when it comes to projects and funds, central ministries and agencies view local authorities as informal partners and implement policies from a centralised perspective. This essentially leaves municipal governing bodies with inadequate training and education. As a result, EU funding for green transitions remain unused, and green growth in southern EU Member States show a development gap compared to their northern counterparts (Technical Chamber of Greece , 2023).
An Irish-style deliberation would serve as an intervention mechanism to local authorities which, in turn, would support stronger partnerships (Crescenzi, 2016; Council of Europe, 2025). Therefore, actively involving the regional administrative apparatus in the policy space would help meet EU climate goals while maintaining social and economic cohesion between all Member States (Hay, et al., 2020).
The Irish Experience
The first polycrisis led to a series of financial support mechanisms where the European Union (EU) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) presented a set of conditions in response to Ireland’s housing market collapse. Within this complex web of leveraging domestic reform, and implementing fiscal consolidation, the people of Ireland were considered less equipped to make recommendations in taxation and public spending.
In the wake of the financial crash, nuanced decisions made by political officials widened the gap in voters’ confidence and this drove discussions as to whether civic dialogue and recommendations could break the deadlock between elected representatives, and the people. In 2011, the Republic of Ireland pioneered the pilot assembly We the Citizen’s which accommodated a consensus by reshaping policies through incorporating diverse perspectives. This democratic participatory project saw randomly selected citizens and national politicians work alongside one another to discuss, debate, and reflect on evidence on a series of topics, with their views then presented as proposals to the government (The Citizens’ Assembly , 2023; Farrell, et al., 2013). This process then led to the Constitutional Convention (2012), and the Irish Citizens’ Assembly (2016) which institutionalized the concept of deliberative democracy. The mini-publics consisted of ninety-nine Irish citizens, enhancing the opportunity to discuss recommendations on issues of abortion, the ageing population, gender equality, biodiversity loss and drug use (The Citizens’ Assembly, 2025).
Counterintuitively, governance areas taken from the survey with reference to implementation procedures, government preparedness, institutional trust, stakeholder participation, policymaking, and socio-cultural differences identified a gap in stakeholder policy recommendations; more precisely southern EU Member States currently do not have an institutional mechanism for civic engagement. I contend that the Irish experience offers a blueprint for deliberative discussions relevant to the governance dichotomy as it provides a structural framework that could, in turn, systemically narrow the divide between the northern and southern divide, while also sustainably implementing the EGD across southern EU Member States.
The European Union and the Union of the Mediterranean for Deliberation (EUFMD)
The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership – The Barcelona Process (1995) – was formulated to optimise dialogue and cooperation across political, economic, social, and cultural sectors. Further to this, in 2008, the Union of the Mediterranean (UfM), established by the French EU Presidency and President Nicola Sarkozy, was an effort to rejuvenate the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (Ministère de l’europe et des affaires étrangères, 2025; Union for the Mediterranean, 2025). Moreover, building on these strategic pillars, President Emmanuel Macron initiated the Two Shores Summit (2019) within the scope to rekindle a cooperation momentum and enhance multilateral relations. Later in 2022, the Mediterranean Forum established a mandate that would further reinforce efforts in civic engagement and dialogue (Ministère de l’europe et des affaires étrangères, 2025).
Consistent within this framework, joint multilateral discussions between the EU, UfM and dialogue for deliberation (EUFMD) could enhance cooperation and policy ownership. In the long run, as in the Irish experience, the first polycrisis was a pivotal factor in the ripple effect of a systemic decomposition. Ireland, on the other hand, saw this as an opportunity to engage in public dialogue. Over a period of fifteen years, the island-nation successfully accomplished to pioneer civic engagement and governance through consensus. Moreover, deliberation processes were made an integral part of reshaping the country’s policies.
According to the survey, EU southern Member States, Greece, Italy, and Spain indicate different results in EU Regulation and Directive implementation. Collective discussions between the European Union, the Union of the Mediterranean on deliberation (EUFMD) could help articulate why EU laws and strategies differ in the north comparatively to the south. This, in turn, could produce valuable policy outcomes as well as support green transition efforts thorughout all EU Member States which would effectively narrow the gap between the north and south.
Conclusions
The overall aim of this paper was to create a comprehensive understanding of EGD inclusiveness, and how divergences between the northern and southern EU Member States can narrow their gap systemically through an institutionalised deliberative process. This paper examines how Ireland’s experience could be the blueprint that would initiate the successful enforcement of EU Green Deal Regulations and Directives so that no one is left behind (Luskin, 2005; Farrell, 2014). The island-nation’s structural approach to the first and second polycrisis presented an open opportunity for civic engagement that encompassed public decisions which discerned the need for reliable relations and partnerships in green transition initiatives. This tactic effectively offered inherent benefits, and a holistic approach to help reshape regenerative solutions that will impact future generations (Council of Europe , 2025; Farrell, et al., 2013).
The findings in the survey indicated that existing divergences create challenges in the EGD implementation process. If the European Union is to successfully transition to greener economies, and reach its targets for climate neutrality, then a collective consensus is pertinent for the implementation of the strategy throughout all EU Member States (European Committee on Democracy, 2023). Former President of the European Commission and visionary architect Jacques Delors stated that widening and deepening Europe must be accompanied by reinforced cohesion, which is the pillar of the European Union’s social market economy (Letta, 2024). Aristotle in the Constitution of the Athenians (Chapter 40) expressed that the stability of a political system deeply relies on inclusivity and adherence to deliberative processes (Kordatos, 1939).
Southern EU Member States call for a structured deliberation approach for its green transition, especially when, according to the data, countries like Greece, Italy, and Spain confront serious disproportionate socio-economic challenges in governance, economy, and technological innovation (Papandreou, 2024). Therefore, if the south supports an institutional deliberative democracy, it can ensure that the EU Green Deal strategy remains inclusive and socially just, hence leaving no one behind (Circle the Med, 2026).
Consequently, through an Irish-style deliberation, the European Union, and the Union for the Mediterranean (EUFMD) could provide a space to initiate talks for deliberative mechanisms that would strengthen stakeholder participation while also enhancing regional cooperation. Hence, participatory mechanisms could contribute in narrowing the gap between the EU north and south.
A further possible achievement of a potential EU, UfM for deliberation (EUFMD) organisation could be the development of a systemic Mediterranean deliberate governance. Such efforts, in turn, would supplement the support of the European Union’s target to become the first continent to reach climate neutrality by 2050 and net a reduction of greenhouse gas emissions of at least 55% by 2030, while addressing social and economic inclusiveness thus, ensuring that climate initiatives are a priority in each EU Member State’s agenda.
Author’s Contact Details: christina.giannou@elgs.eu
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[i] The European Commission further emphasises that the transition “must be just and inclusive. It must put people first and that “active public participation and confidence in the transition is paramount if policies are to work and be accepted… (Commission, 2019).
[ii] European Climate Law (2021), “Fit for 55” Package (2021), Energy Efficiency Directive (2023), Renewable Energy Directive (2023), Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (2023), Social Climate Fund Regulation (2023), and Nature Restoration Regulation (2024), (Bas-Defossez, 2022); (Widuta, 2021).
[iii] Rooted in the Lisbon Treaty (2009) and Treaty of the European Union (1993); (The Principle of Conferral: Article 5(2); Respect for National Identities: Article 4(2); The Right to Withdraw: Article 50); (Lanza, 2010). The Green Deal strategy that the EU establishes its objectives through Regulations and Directives which are binding; The implementation process by national governments can be viewed as a hybrid process in that EU legislation enactment process by EU Member States is part of the structural components which entail operational preparedness, governance and civic cultural traits, climate, and geographical location.