Could Ireland Go Nuclear? Regulatory frameworks, technology choice, and infrastructure issues

In Summary

• Significant legislative and regulatory reforms would be required before nuclear power could be introduced in Ireland.
• Small Modular Reactors (SMR) are not yet sufficiently mature for widespread deployment.
• Nuclear power has significant cost barriers compared to established technologies such as wind, solar, and battery storage.
• Due to legislative, regulatory, infrastructure and construction timelines, it is difficult to foresee nuclear power deployment being possible in Ireland before 2050.
• A comprehensive technoeconomic feasibility study on nuclear power could provide more clarity for policymakers.

1.    Introduction

Ireland has set an ambitious target of reducing its Greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) by 51% by 2030 and achieving carbon neutrality by 2050. Ireland is facing multiple challenges to these targets including rising demand for electricity, particularly from data centres, the need to electrify particular sectors, which adds to the rise in demand, and finally, enhancing energy security.

Ireland’s electricity system remains reliant on a combination of fossil fuels, renewables, and imports. In 2024, fossil fuels accounted for 45.3% (16.4 TWh) of electricity generation, followed by renewables at 40% (14.5 TWh)^[i], and net imports and non-renewable wastes (NRW) at 14.8% (5.4 TWh) (SEAI 2025a). While emissions have been declining steadily over the past years^[ii], the pace of reductions is not sufficient to meet the 2030 Climate Action Plan (CAP) targets, and by extension, legally binding EU emission obligations (SEAI 2025b). Hence, there is now a critical need to assess a broad range of clean energy technologies to help address these multi-faceted challenges.

One technology that has re-emerged in public discussions in Ireland is nuclear power. The public debate surrounding nuclear power has gained considerable attention recently, partly driven by the ongoing fuel crisis. To date, Ireland’s use of nuclear energy has been limited to importing electricity derived from Great Britain’s nuclear power stations through interconnectors (Irish Academy of Engineering 2025).

The aim of this policy paper is to provide a multi-dimensional assessment of what might be required for the potential deployment of nuclear power in Ireland. We approach this topic through an evidence-based approach, in line with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Milestones in the Development of a National Infrastructure for Nuclear Power report. The report outlines 19 infrastructure challenges that a “newcomer” country must address to deploy nuclear power. We will examine several of these challenges that are relevant for the Irish context, while also considering whether there are potential enablers that might support this technology

2. Existing Frameworks for Nuclear Energy in Ireland

2.1 Statutory prohibition on nuclear power

Ireland has enacted statutory bans on generation of power from nuclear fission and nuclear installations. These bans are enforced through Section 18(6) of the Electricity Regulation Act 1999 and Section 182 of the Planning and Development Act 2024. The former prohibits the use of nuclear fission to generate electricity, while the latter forbids the development of nuclear installations^[iii].

2.3 Nuclear regulatory reforms

If Ireland were to commence with a civil nuclear power programme, the immediate hurdle would be amending the statutory bans on electricity production and nuclear installations in Section 18(6) of the Electricity Regulation Act 1999 and Section 182 of the Planning and Development Act 2024.^[vi] As this would be a politically contingent process, it is beyond the scope of this paper, but given the previous opposition within Ireland to nuclear power (Baker, 1988) it is likely that such a legislative process would take significant time and would not be guaranteed to succeed. On the licensing front, the Ionising Radiation Regulations 2019 already grants the EPA authority to issue licenses for the construction and operation of nuclear and waste management facilities. Therefore, no modifications would be needed to allow the EPA to license a nuclear plant (Smith 2022), unless the licensing function were reassigned to a different body.

Another important step in this process would be the creation of an independent nuclear regulatory authority. The regulatory body would need to have sufficient legal powers to oversee and regulate various aspects of a nuclear programme, including the use of nuclear materials, licensing and operational procedures, safety standards, nuclear waste management, decommissioning regulations, and work force training.

Given that the EPA, and in particular, the Office of Radiation Protection and Environmental Monitoring^[vii] is already tasked with regulating radiation, it could assume interim regulatory responsibilities for nuclear power plants (NPP) (Smith 2022). Nevertheless, as the regulatory requirements expand, the nuclear division may exceed the resource and scope limitations of the EPA. Consequently, there would be a necessity for a new and independent organization that is separate from other functions of the EPA or indeed, other state agencies. The establishment of the Maritime Area Regulatory Authority (MARA) in 2023, to oversee licensing and regulation of the offshore renewable energy sector demonstrates that such precedent exists in Ireland.

Recent examples from nuclear newcomer countries indicate a preference to consolidate regulatory powers in a single public body. For example, the United Arab Emirates Federal Authority for Nuclear Regulation (FANR), the Egyptian Nuclear and Radiological Regulatory Authority (ENRRA) and the Turkish Nuclear Regulatory Authority.

3. Future technology development and deployment

There are several types of nuclear technology which in theory could be deployed in Ireland. We will focus on nuclear fission technologies.^[viii] Nuclear fission is a process where a neutron collides with an atomic nucleus (example: uranium-235) causing it to split and release additional neutrons, which then kickstarts a chain reaction that generates intense heat. Nuclear plants harness this heat to convert water into steam, which drives turbines to generate electricity. In this section, we will adopt the generational classification, based upon successive generations of nuclear power plant technologies, and concentrate on the more recent generations.^[ix] To date, there are five generations of nuclear plants (I, II, III, III+, and IV). Although there is no clear definition for each generation, they are relatively distinct in terms of design, safety features, and deployment period, among others.

3.1 Large-scale reactors

• Generation II (1965-1995)

Gen II reactors were designed to be economical and reliable. They began commercial operations in the 1960s and comprise the bulk of today’s global nuclear power fleet. These reactors utilise traditional active safety features that rely on electrical or mechanical functions to work (Goldberg and Rosner 2011). Additionally, they require large electricity grids due to their sizable capacity which reaches 1 GW on average. Gen II reactors are ageing, and many have extended their operational lifetime beyond 40 years. Very few units are under construction globally (~ 2 reactor units), and they are typically not the go-to choice for newcomer countries. 

• Generation III and III+ (Advanced and evolutive reactors)

Gen III and III+ reactors represent an evolution of the Gen II reactors. These reactors are designed to operate longer, typically 60 years. The key features of this reactor class include the use of passive safety systems which do not require operator actions or electronic feedback such as gravity, natural convection, or resistance to high temperatures. Other features include standardised designs to speed up licensing process, simpler design, improved fuel efficiency, and higher availability (Goldberg and Rosner 2011; WNA 2025). Gen III and III+ reactors represent the vast majority of nuclear reactors currently under construction globally (~57 out of 63 reactor units) (Schneider et al. 2025). This generation of reactors is now the preferred choice for newcomer countries in the nuclear sector.

• Generation IV (Innovative designs)

Gen IV reactors are a new class of reactors that represent the ‘future of nuclear power’. They utilise novel cooling materials such as molten salt and lead (see Figure 1). Additionally, they are designed to eliminate severe accidents, deploy enhanced safety systems, and operate at high temperatures which allows them to be used for other industrial uses (e.g. hydrogen production). They are expected to be deployed beyond the 2030s.

3.2 Small Modular Reactors (SMR)

The IAEA classifies small modular reactors (SMRs) as a reactor with a capacity of up to 300 MW. Two key features define SMRs: they are designed to accommodate multiple reactor units that can be added incrementally, and they can be constructed using prefabricated modules. The recent interest in SMRs can be traced to the existing challenges facing large nuclear plants, namely, high costs and protracted lead times. However, it is important to note that the concept of SMRs is not new; they have been around since the 1950s and 60s. In fact, the nuclear reactors commissioned under the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission’s (AEC) Power Demonstration Reactor Programme (PDRP) in the 1950s were within the 300 MW capacity range. To achieve economies of scale, the nuclear industry quickly transitioned to larger reactors.

The commercial viability of SMR technologies remains uncertain as Figure 1 shows. Of the approximately 62 SMR designs worldwide, only four reactors are currently operational, and two of these are experimental or demonstrators, the HTR-10 in China and the High Temperature Engineering Test Reactor (HTTR) in Japan. Three SMRs are currently undergoing construction, and are encountering various challenges related to design, regulatory issues, and supply chain, as shown in Table 1. 

Notably, 25 of the 62 SMR designs utilise untested or rarely used reactor types such as sodium, molten-salt, and lead. Furthermore, most traditional vendors have not actively pursued the development and construction of SMRs. Instead, many current designs are being developed by companies with little or limited prior experience in delivering power reactors (Thomas and Ramana 2022).

For prototype reactor designs, achieving mass production and widespread deployment would necessitate the harmonization and standardization of designs, codes, and licensing processes—a challenging task that is unlikely to be feasible in the short term. In this context, the IAEA is currently developing a Global Framework for Advanced Reactor Reviews (GFARR) aimed at fostering greater harmonisation between national regulatory bodies in the licensing of advanced reactors and SMRs (IAEA 2026b). While the framework is expected to be released in 2028, its practical integration into national regulatory processes is unlikely to occur before the early 2030s (IAEA 2026b). 

In summary, SMRs are largely still in the early stages of development. It is estimated that commercial releases may commence in the late 2030s to mid-2040s, with a mature market emerging in the late 2040s (ATSE 2024). 

Figure 1: SMR technology development in 2026. Source: own illustration based on (IAEA 2026a)

Table 1: Key challenges associated with SMR’s currently under construction. Source: Anjum and Islam (2025); IAEA 2026a

3.3 Technology choice of newcomer countries

Newcomer countries often tend to select established nuclear reactor technology designs. As of 2025, three newcomer countries are constructing or about to start construction of nuclear reactors; Bangladesh (two reactors), Egypt (four reactors), and Türkiye (four reactors) (Schneider et al. 2025). All three countries have opted for large Pressurised Water Reactor (PWR) designs with capacity greater than 1 GW and are being built by the Russian state-owned corporation Rosatom.

More broadly countries such as Ghana, Jordan, Uzbekistan, Indonesia, and Saudi Arabia have signalled intentions to introduce nuclear power but have yet to select a nuclear technology design or in some cases, raise adequate financing. In essence, SMRs are not the favoured technology of choice for newcomer countries, seeking to develop a commercial nuclear power sector.

Ireland as a newcomer country would be facing a choice of either a large-scale (Gen III or III+) nuclear reactor or a SMR. Given the low maturity level and scarce operational history of SMRs, it is difficult to foresee Ireland selecting this technology in the near-term. The alternative is a mature large-scale reactor. There again, Ireland will need to navigate significant barriers including grid capacity constraints and already high levels of unutilised variable renewable power, siting constraints, and costs to name a few.  Regardless of the technology choice, Ireland will face a range of challenges as previously mentioned and elaborated upon below.

3.4 Nuclear deployment timeline

The IAEA provides a guidance document outlining a three-phased milestone approach for countries that are embarking on a commercial nuclear programme (IAEA 2024). Developing a complete nuclear programme from initial planning to the operation of the first nuclear plant is estimated to take at least 10 to 15 years (IAEA 2024).

In the case of Ireland, the first step prior to developing a nuclear programme would be to add the nuclear bill onto the Government Legislative Programme, which we term as phase zero (see Figure 2). There are multiple checkpoints before this happens. First, the relevant department would establish the baseline by conducting detailed studies and public consultation on nuclear power. Once the studies have been completed, the department would then draft the general scheme (or Heads of Bill) which will undergo pre-legislative scrutiny (PLS) by the relevant Committee. Following PLS, the committee produces a report with recommendations and submits it to the Houses of the Oireachtas. The draft Bill would need cabinet approval to be published. Once the Bill is published, it needs to go through five stages in both the Dáil and Seanad before it can be enacted. The entire process to introduce a nuclear bill can conservatively take between 5-10 years, or even longer.

This timeline may also vary depending on the choice of nuclear technology, either a large-scale conventional NPP or SMR. The deployment timeline would also vary depending on the speed of adding nuclear technology to Ireland’s national energy strategies. Other factors that will determine the deployment timelines are public opinion, length of process for establishing the required legal and regulatory frameworks, and the amount of resources allocated to the programme.

Considering the time required for SMRs to become commercially viable (approximately 15-20 years), the time needed to introduce nuclear legislation (5-10 years), and IAEAs three-phase approach to develop a domestic nuclear programme (10-15 years), it is likely that SMRs would not be ready for operations until the late 2050s at best, assuming no concerted public or political opposition (Figure 2a).

Figure 2: Speculative timelines for SMR deployment in Ireland. (Source: own illustration)

Alternatively, the IAEA phased approach could be initiated in parallel whilst SMR technologies are reaching commercial readiness stages (Figure 2b). Essentially, this means that the emergence of nuclear energy on the political agenda and the development of a nuclear programme are not contingent on SMR maturity levels, but are instead influenced by broader concerns about energy security and the need for low-carbon alternatives.  This would suggest a potential SMR deployment between 2041 and 2051.

Deploying a fleet of SMRs would push the timescale even further. Likewise, any delays in initiating plans for a nuclear programme, along with public opposition would push the timescale even further again. Given these factors, it is therefore challenging to envisage how SMRs will be ready for operations before 2050 and meaningfully contribute to 2050 emission reduction targets.

4. Potential Barriers to Deployment of Nuclear Energy in Ireland

In addition to the significant timeline required to deploy nuclear energy for any state which has not yet done so, there are specific technical and policy challenges which would need to be overcome before Ireland could deploy this technology.

4.1 Nuclear waste management

The first such challenge centres on the management and disposal of nuclear waste. If it sought to develop nuclear energy, how would Ireland manage the radioactive waste from NPPs?

Nuclear waste is classified according to their level of radioactivity^[x]. For brevity, we will focus on High-Level Wase (HLW) which generates a significant amount of heat, contains large volumes of long-lived radioactive components, and represents the greatest long-term risk to the population and environment (Ahlswede et al. 2026). HLW requires robust storage solutions that can last for up to hundreds of thousands of years (Bärenbold et al. 2024).

There are two primary approaches to managing HLW. The first involves storing the waste in an interim state before disposing it in a permanent facility. After a spent fuel assembly is removed from the reactor core, it is initially placed in a spent fuel pool to ‘cool down’. The cooling period lasts at least five years but can extend even longer. Once cooled, the still radioactive spent fuel is transferred to a steel-reinforced dry cask container. Typically, the dry cask container is licensed for a period of 40 years. This is currently the primary approach to dealing with spent nuclear fuel in many countries.

Experts recommend that these dry casks be deposited in a deep geological repository for long-term permanent storage. To date, no country has constructed a full-scale deep geological repository. Nevertheless, several countries such as Switzerland, Sweden, and Finland have identified site location for a deep geological repository (Bärenbold et al. 2024), and are making progress in planning, licensing, and constructing such repositories.

The second approach involves reprocessing nuclear waste to recover usable material for fresh nuclear fuel. This practice is adopted in a few countries, such as China, France, Japan, Russia, and India. However, reprocessing still emits residual high-level waste, which requires final disposal (Ahlswede et al. 2026).

Furthermore, the choice of nuclear technology and number of reactors will also be significant for nuclear waste management in Ireland. Contrary to claims that an SMR would generate a smaller volume of nuclear waste, recent studies indicate that the volume of low and intermediate level waste (LILW) and high-level waste (HLW) could be substantial (Kim et al. 2024), potentially increasing by factors of 2 and 30 for certain SMR designs (Krall et al. 2022).

Ireland’s approach to nuclear waste management

Under Ireland’s regulatory framework, the EPA is responsible for licensing a nuclear waste facility.^[xi] The regulations mandate that an NPP owner/operator is fully responsible for the financing, safety, and overall management of the radioactive waste generated and the nuclear waste repository^[xii]. The EPA will not grant a license for the import or export of nuclear waste unless, at the time of shipment there is a legally binding agreement in force between Ireland and a destination country and the shipment is in line with stringent EU Commission criteria^[xiii]. In practice, these regulations effectively encourage that nuclear waste be managed in Ireland. To accomplish this task, the existing regulatory frameworks would need to be updated to include guidelines on the management of various classes of nuclear waste during the commercial operation as well as during the complex decommissioning stage.

Notably, the 1974 site report for the Carnsore Point nuclear plant did not address long-term nuclear waste management in depth; instead, it envisaged that spent nuclear fuel would be stored on site on an interim basis and exported for reprocessing (ESB 1974). Five decades on, such an approach is inadequate, given the constraints on nuclear waste export.

If Ireland were to follow international best practice and dispose of the nuclear waste in deep geological repository following an interim storage period, the regulatory frameworks will also need to provide guidelines on the siting, surveying, and financing of such as a repository. Inevitably, siting a geological repository is a challenging process due to the fundamental problem of inequitable allocation of burden and risks. For Ireland, this raises more questions than answers that exceed the scope of this policy brief. For example,

Are there any locations suitable for a deep geological repository in Ireland?

Can counties object to the siting of nuclear waste repositories?

Does the Government have the final determination for siting a nuclear waste repository?

Will host communities receive monetary or in-kind compensation?

Several countries including Switzerland, Sweden, Finland, and France have adopted a consent-based approach to the siting, whereby a community ‘consents’ to host a nuclear waste repository.

4.2. Siting a nuclear facility

There are various criteria for selecting potential locations for an NPP. For brevity, we will focus on a few screening criteria that are relevant for Ireland and briefly relate it to Carnsore Point, the proposed site for Ireland’s first NPP in the early 1970s.^[xiv]

First, a nuclear facility should be located in a sparsely populated area and away from dense population areas. This is to mitigate the potential impact of radioactive releases on current as well as projected population.  A typical example of this criteria is to have (1) as little population in the immediate vicinity of the nuclear plant where only power plant operations are allowed (i.e., exclusion zone), (2) ensuring that the population does not exceed 10,000 within a 5 km radius of the nuclear plant, and (3) limiting the population centre to no more than one million within a 30 km radius (Verma and Gundlapalli, 2008).^[xv] Ireland’s particularly dispersed settlement patterns may present a challenge in relation to this criteria. Carnsore Point in Country Wexford was selected due to the low population density at the time of surveying (ESB 1974).

Second, NPPs need access to water for consumption, cooling, and other safety requirements. Nuclear plants are typically located on sites with access to water bodies such as an ocean, lake, or river with sufficient low temperatures (IAEA 2012). However, water withdrawals from rivers, lakes, streams, or aquifers in Ireland are subject to rigid controls^[xvi]. Any user that withdraws more than 2,000 /day or greater requires a full licence from the EPA. These controls make it unlikely for a NPP to be located inland, leaving the coastal areas as potential sites. Carnsore Point was selected specifically for this reason. According to ESB, the proposed site beside the Irish Sea was ideal to extract sea water for cooling purposes and discharge (ESB 1974). Early estimates suggested that the nuclear plant would have required approximately 240,000 gallons of water per day (Power et al. 1972).

Third and more relevant to Ireland is flooding risks. The potential location for a NPP should be away from areas that are prone to flooding caused by high tides, storm surges, wind generated waves, intense precipitation, or a combination of factors (IAEA 2012; Verma and Gundlapalli, 2008). Ireland has been exposed to major flooding incidents over the past decade. According to the 2025 National Climate Change Risk Assessment, extreme changes to precipitation levels are expected to result in more frequent and severe river, surface water, and groundwater flooding events in Ireland (EPA 2025). Ireland’s coastal areas are also experiencing coastal erosion and flooding, and these risks are projected to rise over the coming years (EPA 2025).

Fourth, the geotechnical characteristics of a potential site should be suitable for an NPP. Ideally, a firm bedrock, stable geology, away from fault lines, deep groundwater table, among others. A comprehensive geological survey is required to pinpoint areas that fulfil these geotechnical criteria. Carnsore Point was selected due to having a suitable rock foundation and elevation (ESB 1974).

Lastly, the potential location should be easily accessible by road and rail network. This criterion would significantly restrict the number of potential sites for a NPP in Ireland. In the case of Carnsore Point, being close to the coast provided logistical advantages, as it allowed for the possibility of receiving large reactor components by barge during the construction phase (Power et al. 1972).

In summary, the number of potential locations in Ireland that would meet the criteria discussed above as well as other criteria not mentioned would be limited.

4.3 Economics of nuclear power

Costs

The nuclear industry continues to be hampered by substantial construction cost overruns, delays, and unfavourable financial viability. The poor relative economics of nuclear are expected to persist^[xvii] largely due to the growth in low-cost renewable deployment and efficient strategies to manage demand loads. SMR technologies are not immune to these trends. Their smaller capacity means manufacturers struggle to capitalize on economies of scale, resulting in higher costs per unit of installed capacity compared to larger reactor units.

Capital costs pose a major obstacle for nuclear power plants. Figure 3 compares the overnight capital costs (OCC) of a large-scale Pressurised Water Reactor (PWR12-BE), three SMR technology variants (Light Water (LW), Gas-cooled (GC) and Molten Salt (MS), and a combined cycle natural gas plant (NGCC) with and without carbon capture. The estimated OCC of a PWR12-BE, LW-SMR, GC-SMR, and MS-SMR is €5,519/kW, €5,813/kW, €5,225/kW, and €4,781/kW respectively.

This suggests that the capital costs of the selected SMR technologies range between €4,780/kW to €5,810/kW which is more than or slightly below that of a large-scale conventional NPP (€5,519/kW). In practical terms, this means that the costs of electricity from SMR will be significantly expensive. In comparison, capital costs for natural gas plants are significantly lower than nuclear plants.  In response to these economic pressures, SMR manufacturers are now scaling up reactor sizes to better leverage economies of scale. A notable example is the NuScale SMR project, which was initiated in 2015 with plans to construct 12 reactors (each with a capacity of 50 MW) in a single facility. However, in November 2023, NuScale developers agreed to terminate the project after downsizing to six reactors and increasing the capacity of individual power modules from 50 MW to 60 MW and ultimately 70 MW. The financial outlook of the project was extremely challenging, with estimated costs escalating from $4.2 billion in 2018 to $9.3 billion in 2023.

Figure 3: Overnight capital costs of nuclear reactor types. Source: own illustration based on (Asuega et al. 2023)

Note: Estimates have been price adjusted and converted from USD 2021 to Euro 2025 values.

Nuclear vs renewables

Nuclear power remains significantly more expensive than renewable technologies such as wind and solar. Lazard (2025) estimated that the levelized cost of energy (LCOE) for nuclear power to range between €120 to €188/MWh ($141-$220/MWh).^[xviii]

By contrast, the LCOE for selected renewable technologies are substantially lower, as outlined below:

• Onshore wind plant: €32 to €73/MWh ($37-$86/MWh)
• Offshore wind plant: €60 to 134/MWh ($70-$157/MWh)
• Solar PV utility: €32 to €67/MWh ($38-$78/MWh)
• Geothermal: €56 to €93/MWh ($66-$109/MWh)

In a comprehensive study, Steigerwald et al. 2023 estimated future construction costs of 15 SMR technologies and found that none of the technologies were able to compete economically with existing renewable technologies, even after taking variability and system integration costs of renewables into account.

Liability provisions and decommissioning

In the event of a nuclear accident, the cost of damages is covered through liability frameworks established in national legislation. These frameworks typically operate through multiple funding ‘tiers’. The first tier consists of mandatory liability coverage held by a nuclear operator. If the operator liability is exhausted, a second tier usually funded or guaranteed by the national government is activated. A third tier may provide additional coverage through various international treaties.

Evidence suggests that existing nuclear liability funds provide significantly less financial coverage compared to the potential costs of a nuclear accident. Schneider et al., 2023 reviewed liability funds across 18 nuclear-operating countries and found that the majority of countries have less than €2.8 billion in coverage from all sources. In comparison, the total cost of the Fukushima Daiichi accident is estimated at €153.9 billion ($166.6 billion) as of 2023, with costs continuing to escalate (Schneider et al. 2025).

When accident costs exceed available insurance and liability funds, governments are ultimately forced to take over additional costs of accidents, placing significant and unexpected pressure on the national exchequer.

Similar fiscal risks arise during the decommissioning phase of nuclear facilities. Although only a handful of reactors have been fully decommissioned to date, empirical evidence suggests that decommissioning projects have frequently experienced substantial cost overruns (Lordan‑Perret et al. 2023). These overruns raise concerns over the adequacy of existing funds, funding mechanisms, and the potential exposure of governments to long-term liabilities.

4.4 Integration of nuclear in the Irish energy system

According to IAEA guidelines, a new nuclear reactor or any single generating unit should not exceed 10% of the total grid capacity (IAEA 2024). Nuclear plants by design, provide baseload generation, which means that demand should be large enough to be served. Already, wind and solar plants in Ireland are forced to limit their output (i.e., dispatch down) due to grid capacity limits, system stability reasons, and maintenance outages, among others. In 2025, dispatch down was recorded at 11.4% and 12.8% for wind and solar respectively (EirGrid 2026).

Furthermore, it is well documented that nuclear reactors are constructed in multiples (see section 3.3) and this is for several reasons such as reliability, smoothed grid balancing, shared infrastructure, and leveraging economies of scale. Ireland’s small grid size and existing renewable curtailment make deploying nuclear power challenging, as nuclear units require large, stable baseload demand and are typically built in multi‑reactor configurations to be economically viable.

4.5 Public opinion

Research examining the public acceptance of a possible rollout of nuclear power in Ireland is relatively limited, reflecting the absence of nuclear energy from energy policy considerations since the 1980s. The limited available information suggests that support for nuclear energy remains low, though trends higher when the question is framed as “considering” nuclear energy for energy security rather than an immediate commitment to build (Lynch & Wright, 2012).

Given the impact of public acceptance on power system developments which enjoy higher levels of public support in Ireland (Plaga et al, 2024), acceptance issues may increase the rollout timeline and costs for nuclear energy.

5. Potential Enablers of Deployment of Nuclear Power in Ireland

5.1 Firm power provision

A clear advantage of nuclear, irrespective of its size, is its ability to provide firm, reliable zero-emission dispatchable power. Ireland needs firm backup power to complement its existing renewable capacity.

5.2 Flexibility

Flexible or non-baseload operation refers to the ability of the nuclear plant to adapt their output to match electricity system demand (IAEA 2025). One way of controlling a reactor’s output is by inserting or withdrawing control rods in the reactor core. This has certain operational risks. Rapidly altering a reactor’s core power changes fuel temperatures, which can lead to thermal and mechanical stresses and could potentially reduce fuel lifetime (Jenkins et al. 2018).

France’s nuclear fleet is often cited as a leading example of nuclear plant flexibility, with reactors engaging in flexible operations to complement fluctuating load and intermittent renewables (Morilhat et al. 2019). However, this capability has been enabled by specific reactor designs, operating practices, and regulatory frameworks that were developed over more than three decades. Beyond the French experience, there are sparse documented cases of nuclear plants operating in a consistently flexible manner.

By contrast, the United States, which has the largest commercial nuclear fleet predominantly operates its reactors as baseload generation (Abou-Jaoude et al. 2024). This reflects prevailing market conditions in which continuous, high‑capacity operation is generally more economical (Bah 2023), and incentives for flexibility are limited.

Furthermore, due to the impact of increasing variable renewable penetration in power systems, such as in Ireland’s case, the market niche for inflexible baseload plants is declining and is taken over by renewables. In a recent study, the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) indicates that solar and wind paired with battery energy storage systems (BESS) represent an emerging asset class and are well positioned to provide ‘firm supply’ to high demand users at increasingly low cost (IRENA 2026).

5.3 Specific use-cases: Data Centres

As of 2026, Ireland currently has 128 data centres, the bulk of which (96) are located in Dublin.^[xix] Data centres are putting a significant strain on the grid, and in 2024, they represented 21.2% (7 TWh) of total electricity demand in Ireland (SEAI 2025a). The Commission for Regulation of Utilities (CRU) Large Energy Users (LEU) Connection Policy stipulates that new data centres are required to provide dispatchable onsite generation and/or storage capacity which matches their maximum import demand capacity (CRU 2025). The generation unit must be separately connected and participate in the wholesale electricity market. Furthermore, the data centre should meet at least 80% of their demand with renewable power.

Nuclear power plants such as a SMR could in theory meet these requirements (i.e. dispatchable zero-emission power source). However, there are multiple barriers that would make this use-case unfeasible such as:

• Low maturity levels of the technology as described earlier.
• Siting challenge: The bulk of data centres are located in Dublin, near high population areas, which would lead to siting challenges.
• Metering challenges: According to the CRU’s LEU Connection Policy, the generator provided by new data centres should be connected and metered separately to the data centre demand connection.
• High upfront capital costs of SMRs as discussed earlier.

6. Policy Implications

• Given the necessary regulatory, legislative, and infrastructural requirements, an indicative timeline for the rollout of nuclear energy (20-25 years) in Ireland, as discussed in this paper, implies that deployment would not be sufficiently timely to meaningfully contribute to Ireland’s decarbonisation objectives through to 2050.
• There is significant uncertainty in these indicative timelines which are a product of different technology choices (e.g. traditional reactors or SMRs), the unpredictable nature of public acceptance and political prioritisation of new legislation, and whether a sequential or parallel technology rollout is pursued.
• With this level of timeline uncertainty, a comprehensive technoeconomic feasibility study on nuclear power could provide additional clarity for policymakers. The SEAI’s Decarbonised Electricity System Study (DESS), which will consider SMRs as part of its technology assessment, may contribute to a better understanding of these issues.^[xx]
• In the short to medium-term, expanding electricity interconnection with Great Britain and France allows Ireland to access low‑cost nuclear-generated power while avoiding the financial, regulatory, and deployment risks associated with domestic SMR development.

Acknowledgement

This policy brief has benefited from discussions with colleagues at the Sustainable Energy Authority of Ireland (SEAI). We particularly thank Emer Dennehy, John McCann, Jean-Pierre Roux, Shane Ó Húilín, and EóinCullen. We also thank Assoc Prof. Terence O’Donnell of University College Dublin (UCD) for valuable feedback and constructive comments, as well as the ESB Archives for access to historical records. The opinions expressed in this paper are the authors’ and should not be attributed to the SEAI.

References